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THE NATURAL DEATH ACT: PROTECTION FOR
THE RIGHT TO DIE
Thomas H. Schimke, M.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
We consciously and intellectually acknowledge the inevitabil-
ity of our own deaths but unconsciously and emotionally find it
difficult to accept and discuss. However, in recent times the subject
of death and dying has received wide public debate. Approximately
thirty-six states have passed a natural death act during the past
decade, rendering death a public matter and the subject of frank
and open discussion. Public officials are making statements which
were previously almost unthinkable.
Elderly people who are terminally ill have a duty to die ....
Like leaves which fall off a tree forming the humus in which other
plants can grow, we've got a duty to die and get out of the way
with all of our machines and artificial hearts, so that our kids can
build a reasonable life.1
The public has also become more involved as death and dying
frequently occur under medical supervision. Approximately 80% of
deaths in the United States now occur in hospitals and nursing
homes. 2 The traditional sources of patient support, the family and
church, have been replaced or heavily supplemented by doctors,
nurses, hospitals and nursing homes. As a result, we must adopt
new procedures to accomplish prompt and effective communica-
tion and resolution of disagreements among the parties involved in
the medical management of death and dying. New procedures will
help us to solve the increasingly more complex bioethical problems
which arise in the modern medical setting.
Biomedical developments of the past 20 years have made
death more a matter of deliberate decision. For almost any life-
threatening condition, some form of intervention can now delay
the moment of death. Once within the province of fate, death is
* Dr. Schimke graduated from the University of Pennsylvania Medical School in 1965.
He received post-graduate medical education at the Universities of Oregon and Michigan.
He is a Diplomat of the American Boards of Internal Medicine and Pulmonary Disease. Dr.
Schimke has worked for over fifteen years in hospitals caring for patients who require
mechanical ventilation for prolonging life. He is currently a senior at the University of Mon-
tana School of Law.
1. Colorado Governor Richard Lamm addressing the Colorado Health Lawyers Associ-
ation, TiME April 9, 1984, at 68.
2. Zimmerman, Experience with a Hospice-Care Program for the Terminally Ill, 189
ANN. SURG. 683 (1979).
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now a matter of human choice. This development has profound
ethical and legal implications. Medical technology often renders
patients less able to communicate or direct the course of their
treatment. Other people must usually assist in making treatment
decisions or at least acquiesce in carrying them out.
While technology allows physicians to prolong life long enough
to successfully treat a life-threatening disease or injury, technology
also prolongs the dying process without restoring health or a func-
tional life. The more experience we have with technology, the more
we realize the need to evaluate its use and abuse. Consequently,
during the past ten years medical, legal, religious and philosophy
professionals have sought to clarify the goals, rights, duties, and
liabilities of all concerned. Various courts and legislatures have re-
sponded to the need for rules to govern this area.
Four incompatible goals of the health care system render the
evaluation and clarification process arduous. These goals are: (1) to
provide the best health care to all under all circumstances, (2) to
provide equal health care to all, (3) to maximize the free choice of
both the patient and the health care provider, and (4) to contain
cost.,
This article focuses on the rights of a terminally or hopelessly
ill patient as seen through the eyes of a health care provider. It
discusses the legal, moral and medical aspects of the rights of the
terminally or hopelessly ill patient and promotes the legislative
passage of a Montana Natural Death Act.
II. THE PROBLEM
A. Chronic Disease
Approximately two million people die each year in the United
States. With the intervention of modern medicine, acute and rap-
idly fatal diseases are no longer the main cause of death. Chronic
conditions caused 87% of all deaths in 1978." The majority of these
deaths resulted from prolonged illnesses caused by heart disease
(34%), malignancies (22%), and cerebrovascular disease (7%).
Traumatic and usually more sudden deaths, including accidents,
homicides, and suicides, accounted for only 13% of all deaths.5
Those facing death today are frequently patients who suffer
from one or more ailments for which a potentially therapeutic in-
3. Engelhardt, Medical Decisions in a Context of Conflicts, 88 CHEST 172S (1985).
4. Somers, Long Term Care for the Elderly and Disabled, 307 NEw ENG. J. MED. 221
(1982).
5. DEP'T OF HEALTH EDUC. & WELFArE, FACTS OF LiFE AND DEATH 31-33 (1978).
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tervention exists. With the intervention of modern drug and surgi-
cal treatments, almost no disease has a natural history.
Few in our society want to think seriously about aging and
death. Yet both physician and layman alike must be mindful of the
characteristics of chronic illnesses which result in the overwhelm-
ing majority of health care costs in the United States today. Char-
acteristically, chronic illness has a gradual onset, an insidious de-
velopment, and an episodic relapse pattern. It causes great pain
and suffering, and creates serious or catastrophic financial hard-
ship. The constant or intermittent threat of permanent disability
or death causes a panoply of serious psychological consequences:
bewilderment, shock, helplessness, depression, grief, demoraliza-
tion, loss of self-esteem, guilt, shame, anger, resentment, and self-
pity. In turn, these psychological factors affect the patient's quality
of life and will to live.
B. Spiritual Values
Life rarely has intrinsic value for people. Rather it has instru-
mental value-life is good or bad because of the good or bad things
it brings. However, for some, life is infinitely important and death
must be opposed. For others, the inevitability of death gives life
meaning or purpose. For still others, death releases the soul from
its body.
The perspectives on death are as numerous as the philosophies
and religions that give them birth. For each perspective, there exist
complimentary values and priorities for the medical care of dying
patients. A tension develops between the perspectives; it persists
even though society and health care professionals agree that the
avoidance of death should not always be the preeminent goal of
therapy. Assisting each patient to achieve a personally appropriate
death is among the professionals' obligations.7
C. Medical Ethics and Duties
The practice of medicine charges the physician with a duty to
cure, prevent, or ameliorate disease whenever possible, and always
to comfort. The Hippocratic Oath provides in part: "I will pre-
scribe regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability
6. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BI-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 16
(1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
7. Id. at 21-23.
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and my judgment and never do harm to anyone."8 The old medical
ethics were quite clear-only death rendered a case hopeless; eth-
ics precisely defined death as a cessation of cardiorespiratory func-
tion. The physician functioned as a hero in the struggle against
death. Developments in medical technology have made it easy to
just continue treatment with little regard for the costs. However,
seduced by false hopes that technology provides the key to human
conquest of nature, we not only risk losing control of technology,
but we also risk the prospect of becoming unwilling prisoners of
devices originally created to liberate us.9
Therefore, a new ethic developed with the new technology:
"The social commitment of the physician is to prolong life and re-
lieve suffering. Where the observance of one conflicts with the
other, the physician, patient, and/or family of the patient have the
discretion to resolve the conflict."10 Society might expect, then, for
physicians to have special training or at least some resources to
which they might turn when such problems arise. But society's col-
lective refusal to make such decisions leaves physicians without
resources.11
At all times, of course, society expects the physician to keep
his patient's interests paramount. He must confer with his patients
or their next of kin, keep them fully informed, and be guided by
their wishes. Serious possibilities for abuse exist when decisions
are made privately between the patient's family and the physician.
Neither the family nor the physician can invariably and accurately
reflect the desires of the patient. Modern medical ethics no longer
accept the paternalistic approach by the physician to his patient
which was very common a few years ago.
Nevertheless patients and families rely heavily on the profes-
sional judgment and experience of the physician. The physician's
advice is usually the decisive factor in most medical decisions. The
physician generally asks the patient and family to consider the
quality as well as the length of life that might result from each of
the courses of action possible in a given case. There is nothing
more crucial to a physician's professional role than active involve-
ment in these decisions. A physician who fails to assist in this deci-
sion-making role fails to meet kis professional responsibilities.
8. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 609 (26th ed. 1981).
9. Winslade, Thoughts on Technology and Death: An Appraisal of California's Natu-
ral Death Act, 26 DE PAUL L. REv. 717 (1977).
10. CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMA 9 (1982).
11. Hilfiker, Allowing the Debilitated to Die, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 716 (1983).
[Vol. 47
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D. Uncertainty of Prognoses
Every physician knows that there are times when providing
comfort rather than treatment clearly offers the best course of ac-
tion; to do otherwise would inflict unjustifiable suffering or merely
prolong the agony of a terminal or hopeless illness. In many situa-
tions the disadvantages of treatment outweigh the benefits. In
others, risky choices between treatment and no treatment must be
made, even though the calculus of risk, discomfort, and benefit re-
mains unclear. 12
Medicine becomes a very inexact science when physicians
prognosticate about the end of life. Except in cases involving pa-
tients who are very ill with a short prognosis of three to four
months, physicians consistently underestimate survival. Actual
survival coincides with predicted survival in only 16% of pa-
tients.13 This subjective nature of prognoses affects the type of
treatment recommended by the physician which, in turn, affects
the patient's survival.
In one study, physicians who preferred to intubate and
mechanically ventilate a patient with severe chronic lung disease
projected that the patient would survive about 15 months. Other
physicians who decided against mechanical ventilation when
presented with the same case predicted that even with artificial life
support the patient had only six months to live. 4
The uncertainty about the prognosis in cases of permanent
loss of consciousness or chronic vegetative state is of concern when
deciding the right of the comatose patient to die. Many physicians
will not make a firm prognosis in cases of this nature because they
lack absolute certainty that the patient will never regain conscious-
ness. One highly regarded expert15 in this area concluded that: (1)
in cases of traumatic brain damage, if complete unconsciousness
lasts for longer than six weeks, only severe disability can result
from survival; (2) in cases of ischemic brain injury, no independent
intellectual or motor function will return if complete unconscious-
ness lasts longer than four weeks; (3) in cases of dementias or brain
tumors, loss of consciousness for a period lasting as long as one
12. Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 Am. J. LAW AND MED.
233 (1978).
13. Aiken, Hospices: Perspectives on the Public Policy Debate, 37 Am. PSYCH. 1271
(1982).
14. Pearlman, Variability in Physician Bioethical Decisionmaking: A Case Study of
Euthanasia, 97 ANN. INT. MED. 420 (1982).
15. Dr. Fred Plum, Professor of Neurology, Cornell University Medical College.
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month dictates a hopeless prognosis. 6 Despite reliable medical
support, many physicians are averse to recommend the termina-
tion of life-sustaining treatment even after four to six weeks of
coma.
E. Confusing Terminology
There is also uncertainty regarding such terms as "terminal
illness," "hopeless condition," "imminent death," "ordinary and
extraordinary treatment" and "reasonable medical certainty."
While the majority of doctors define terminal illness as "an illness
that progresses to death regardless of what is done," a substantial
number choose to define a terminal illness in terms of longevity;
the duration may vary from less than one month to less than one
year. 7 For purposes of this article, a terminal illness is defined as
an illness likely to cause death within a timeframe which is, to the
patient, very short.18
A hopeless condition is distinct from a terminal condition
when minor life-sustaining treatment, such as tube feedings or in-
sulin, could prolong life for an indefinite period but no meaningful
recovery can occur. The author defines a hopeless condition as a
severe medical illness or injury which precludes basic bodily func-
tions without the sustenance of life-sustaining procedures, and
from which there is no reasonable chance of recovery.
Physicians variously define imminent death commonly used in
the living will and natural death acts. It can mean death in less
than one day or death in less than six months. 19 The definitions of
life-sustaining procedures or artificial life support are similarly va-
ried. The term may include ventilators (by 96% of physicians), in-
travenous feeding (51%), and insulin (34%).20 There also exists a
great deal of ambiguity among physicians regarding whether or not
a prognosis is based on reasonable medical certainty. Physicians
often expect themselves to be mathematically certain of the prog-
nosis despite the reality that their expectation is a medical impos-
sibility. As a result, the patient's terminal treatment, dying, and
suffering can be needlessly prolonged because a physician fears
possible criminal or civil liability for failure to vigorously treat all
medical possibilities.
16. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 459-60.
17. Redleaf, Natural Death Act, 31 STAN. L. REV. 923 (1979).
18. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 26.
19. Id. at 933.
20. Id. at 932.
[Vol. 47
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F. Passive Euthanasia Liability
Physicians are ambivalent about serving as the ultimate deci-
sion-makers and about the public's perception of them as "playing
God." Omitting treatment of patients whose hearts are still beating
represents a radical departure from two thousand years of medical
tradition.21
When a physician omits treatment, the resulting death is
called passive euthanasia.22 This omission may be regarded by the
law as an affirmative action which lead to the same result. "A ma-
terial element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes an
omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender
and which he is physically capable of performing. 2 3 Approxi-
mately 20 states including Montana have statutes which uphold
the common law prohibiting assisting, advising, or otherwise aiding
another to commit suicide. Despite the lack of judicial action
against physicians who practice passive euthanasia, the physician
remains ill at ease due to our laws and our litigious society.
"[Wihat [precedent] there is suggests that the doctor will be
protected if he acts on a good faith judgment that is not grievously
unreasonable by medical standards. 2'5 Despite this assurance, phy-
sicians' concern about possible criminal liability for deliberate
omissions became a reality with the indictment in 1983 of two phy-
sicians on charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder in
Barber v. California.26 The deceased patient underwent surgery for
closure of an ileostomy. In the recovery room the patient suffered a
cardiac arrest. Three days later the physician diagnosed diffuse se-
vere anoxic encephalopathy17 causing a chronic vegetative state
(brain death criteria were not present) with no likelihood of recov-
ery. The doctors complied with a written request from the family
to remove the ventilator. Two days later, at the family's request,
the doctors stopped intravenous fluids. The patient died soon
thereafter; a third party sought a state action against the
physicians.2 '
The magistrate court dismissed the charges against the doc-
tors and the State of California appealed to the Superior Court of
21. J. MCQUADE, MEDICAL PRACTICE Or TRIAL LAWYERS 4-14 (1980).
22. Riga, Euthanasia, The Right to Die and Privacy: Observations on Some Recent
Cases, 11 LINCOLN L. REV. 116 (1980).
23. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-202 (1985).
24. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1985).
25. In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 637, 405 N.E.2d 115, 121 (1980).
26. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
27. Brain disease caused by an absence of oxygen.
28. Barber at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
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Los Angeles.29 The superior court ruled that the doctors' inten-
tional conduct lacked authorization since the patient had not pre-
viously executed a written directive or living will. Viewing the fam-
ily's request as a nullity, the state court reinstated the criminal
charge of murder against the doctors. 30
On appeal by the doctors, the court of appeal stated that legis-
lation offers the only long-term solution to this problem." The
court found that few people have living wills and attributed this to
the typically human characteristics of procrastination and reluc-
tance to contemplate the need for a living will. Further, the court
ruled that: (1) a diagnosis of brain death is not a condition prece-
dent to the cessation of life-sustaining treatment; (2) the discon-
necting of mechanical devices can be compared to withholding
medications or intravenous fluids; (3) the benefits and burdens of
nutrition and hydration may not always provide net benefits to pa-
tients and ought to be evaluated in the same manner as any other
medical procedure; (4) a physician has no duty to continue treat-
ments proven to be ineffective; and (5) the standards of medical
practice authorize a physician to discontinue a form of therapy
which, in his judgment, is useless.32 The court concluded that the
doctors' omission to continue treatment under the circumstances,
though intentional and with knowledge that the patient would die,
was not an unlawful failure to perform a legal duty.3
III. CHANGING MEDICAL ETHICS AND JURISPRUDENCE
A. In re Quinlan
Prior to the celebrated Karen Ann Quinlan case,3 4 the pa-
tient's family and physician or the physician alone commonly
made the decision to withdraw artificial life-sustaining procedures
from a patient who would never regain consciousness or was termi-
nally ill. Undoubtedly, members of the medical profession prac-
ticed euthanasia prior to 1976 by withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining procedures from the terminally ill.35 But, it became im-
perative to some physicians that there be legal rules to regulate
this discretionary euthanasia. They argued that discretionary eu-
29. Id. at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1014, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
32. Id. at 1016-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
33. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
34. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
35. As many as 80% of doctors practiced medicine this way. 21B(1) J. A.M.A. 249
(1971).
386 [Vol. 47
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thanasia placed patients treated by different doctors in inequitable
positions and subjected physicians to the risk of civil or criminal
liability.
B. Informed Consent
Since Judge Cardozo espoused the concept of informed con-
sent in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,"6 courts
have found that patients possess the moral, ethical, and legal right
to be informed of all aspects of their health and should have the
right to participate in all decisions which may affect their health.
The elements of an informed consent are: (1) the diagnosis; (2) the
nature and purpose of the proposed treatment of procedure; (3)
the risks, consequences, and side effects; (4) the probability of suc-
cess; (5) reasonably available alternatives; and (6) result to be an-
ticipated if nothing is done. 7
The right of an individual to determine when bodily invasion
in the form of medical treatment will occur is not a new concept in
the law.
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interfer-
ence by others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.38
Under the doctrine of informed consent and absent an emer-
gency, no medical procedure or treatment may be performed by a
physician without the patient's consent. Absent an informed con-
sent, medical treatment may be variously expressed as assault, bat-
tery, negligence, malpractice, or even trespass. The underlying con-
cept-protection of bodily integrity-remains the crux of informed
consent.39
C. Right to Refuse Treatment
The patient's right to refuse treatment and to withdraw con-
sent at any time logically extends the informed consent doctrine.
The patient's right to informed consent makes no sense without a
right to an informed refusal. The right to refuse should be ex-
tended to the dying patient, for his decision on preferred treat-
36. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
37. Gregory, Informed Consent: An Overview, 9 LEG. Asp. OF MED. PRAC. 4 (Oct. 1981).
38. Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
39. Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for Medical Accidents: From Negligence to
Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 Nma. L. REV. 51 (1977).
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ment is no different from that involved in any other medical situ-
ation. The individual continues to know best his own value
preferences, capacity for pain and suffering, and uncompleted
business and social obligations. He remains the optimal cost
avoider.' o
The primary goal of health care, in general, is to maximize each
patient's well-being. However, a physician merely acting in a pa-
tient's best interests, without recognizing the individual as the piv-
otal decision-maker, fails to respect each patient's interest in self-
determination-the capacity to form, revise and pursue his own
plans for life."
D. The Best Interests Standard
During the past twenty years, conflicts between a physician's
and the patient's determination of the patient's best interest have
been resolved in different ways. In a 1964 Jehovah's Witness trans-
fusion case, the court favored the ethics of the physician and the
"best interests" of the patient. The court ordered the blood trans-
fusions despite the patient's religious beliefs and first amendment
rights to religious freedom.
[T]he doctor's conscience and professional oath must also be
respected. In the present case the patient voluntarily submitted
himself to and insisted upon medical care. Simultaneously he
sought to dictate to treating physicians a course of treatment
amounting to medical malpractice. To require these doctors to ig-
nore the mandates of their own conscience, even in the name of
free religious exercise, cannot be justified under these circum-
stances. The patient may knowingly decline treatment, but he
may not demand mistreatment. 42
E. The Subjective Standard
Recent court decisions, however, have been less utilitarian in
their approach toward a patient's desires. They have instead
adopted a deontological jurisprudence based on the rights of the
"individual as a person." One of the major principles of this juris-
prudence provides that each person enjoys an equal right to the
most extensive basic individual liberty compatible with a similar
liberty for others. Individual autonomy protects the inherent, in-
40. Comment, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1648 (1974).
41. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 26.
42. In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir.). cert. denied. 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
[Vol. 47
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trinsic worth of an individual. The equal right of freedom to decide
to live or die can be based on the principle that "to respect persons
is to recognize that they possess an inviolability founded on justice
that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override."' 3
While individual liberties usually concern an approach to life,
they also involve an approach to death. The respect of a person's
autonomy implies that a person is rational, adequately informed
and can freely give consent. It implies that he alone has both the
equal moral right to be free to live, and, ultimately, the equal right
to be free to decide to die."
In other words, individual autonomy requires the application
of a subjective standard. Under this standard, the subjective values
of the individual outweigh the values of the medical or legal pater-
nalistic approach to determining the patient's best interest,
whether the subjective values are in the patient's best interest. The
President's Commission advocates this standard: "[A] competent
patient's self-determination is and usually should be given greater
weight than other people's views on that individual's well-being."'45
"[T]he value of life ... is lessened not by a decision to refuse
treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human being
the right of choice."' "4
Because medical-legal ethics are changing, the old professional
interests or ethics of the physician will not usually prevail over the
common law and constitutional (religious and privacy) rights of the
individual. In a more recent Jehovah's Witness case,'7 the court
upheld the patient's right to refuse blood transfusions despite the
risk of death. The court found that although the interests or ethics
of the medical profession should be considered, they cannot over-
ride an individual's constitutional right to refuse medical treat-
ment even when the refusal may result in death. However, the
right to decline life-sustaining medical treatment is not absolute.
When coupled with the state's interest in the preservation and
sanctity of life, the protection of innocent third parties, and the
prevention of suicide, the state's interests become compelling and
may at least temporarily override the patient's right to die. In In
re Conroy,48 the court held that the guardian of an eighty-four year
old incompetent, nursing home patient could not have a nasogas-
43. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 586 (1971).
44. M. KOHL, BENEFICENT EUTHANASIA 84 (1975).
45. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 27.
46. Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977).
47. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972).
48. 98 N.J. 321, 348-49, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985).
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tric feeding tube removed until incompetency was properly deter-
mined and the ombudsman for the institutionalized elderly was
notified.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF A PROCEDURE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM
A. Goal
This issue is complex because of conflicts between the varied
interests, both public and private, and the widely divergent and
deeply held values of the parties involved. This complexity necessi-
tates the adoption of a predominately procedural policy to guide
patients, families, clergy, surrogates, health care providers and the
judiciary in the resolution of conflicts surrounding the patient's
right to die.
The goal should be to advance the type of medical treatment
that best promotes a patient's health and well-being, based on that
particular patient's values and goals. No uniform, objective deter-
mination is adequate-whether defined by society or by health
professionals.
Medical cases of this type are usually in court because the hos-
pitals and physicians, fearing civil or criminal liability, are reluc-
tant to follow modern ethical principles. In actuality, treatment of
patients poses more risks than non-treatment since very few cases
involving the omission of treatment have been litigated by surviv-
ing family members.
Although a natural death act neither establishes a right to die
nor guarantees a natural death, it does assure the patient's right to
refuse medical treatment based on the principle of individual au-
tonomy and it protects the health care providers from legal liabil-
ity for an omission.49 While the Montana Living Will Act" protects
those patients who make the proper declaration, the majority of
the terminally or hopelessly ill do not have a living will or a dura-
ble power of attorney. Moreover, they frequently lack competence
to make such a declaration when it is needed. A natural death act
protects the autonomy of terminally or hopelessly ill incompetent
persons.
A natural death act does not, however, include a procedure for
those patients who are brain dead. Because these patients already
meet the statutory definition of death, existing law makes it easier
to deal with their cases.5 1 This existing codification of the Uniform
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122 (1985) (Natural Death Act).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-101 (1985).
51. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1985).
390 [Vol. 47
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Determination of Death Act uses the following medical guidelines
for brain death: (1) cerebral function is absent;5 2 (2) brainstem re-
flexes are absent;53 (3) the cause of coma is established and suffi-
cient to account for the loss of brain function; (4) reversible causes
of brain dysfunction have been ruled out;54 (5) an adequate period
of observation has elapsed; (6) confirmation of the clinical diagno-
sis of brain death by electroencephalography is desirable.55
B. Competency
The patients of primary concern are adults or minors who are
comatose, or medically adjudged to be permanently incompetent
and in a terminal or hopeless condition. This group includes criti-
cally ill or injured patients being kept alive by artificial means. It
also includes senile nursing home patients who require treatment
for an acute illness.
An assessment of the patient's competency is of major impor-
tance at the onset of the decision-making process. This determina-
tion allows all competent persons to direct their own treatment
and protects incompetents from the harmful effects of their own
decisions. The concept of competency, like the concept of danger-
ousness, is vague and involves both medical and legal principles.
The test for competency varies from one context to another. Fur-
ther, there is little legal guidance to illuminate the concept of com-
petency to consent to, or refuse, medical treatment. Medical spe-
cialists use five general tests for competency: (1) simple ability to
make a choice; (2) the ability to make a choice with a reasonable
outcome; (3) ability to make a choice based on rational reasons; (4)
the simple ability to understand; (5) actual understanding.5" None
of these tests is specifically approved for life and death decisions.
However, choices 3 and 5 provide more clear and convincing evi-
dence of competency, and apply more directly to the issue at hand.
Ultimately, decision-making incapacity or incompetency is not
a medical or a psychiatric diagnostic category. Rather, it rests on a
judgment of the type that an informed lay person might make:
that a patient lacks sufficient ability to understand a situation and
52. Coma with cerebral unreceptivity and unresponsivity evidences an absence of cere-
bral function.
53. Brainsten reflexes include pupillary light, corneal, oculovestibular, oropharyngeal,
and respiratory reflexes.
54. Reversible causes of brain dysfunction include sedation, hypothermia, neuromus-
cular blockade, and shock.
55. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, DEFINING DEATH 162-65 (1981).
56. Roth, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134:4 AM. J. PSYCH. 279
(1977).
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to make a choice in light of that understanding. Indeed, when
judges make legal determinations of patients' competence, they
consider the situation not as medical experts but as lay persons
examining the data provided by health care personnel and others.
A simple mental status examination commonly used by physi-
cians should be sufficient to establish competency: orientation,
mood and affect, cognitive function, the presence or absence of hal-
lucinations or delusions, recent and remote memory, logical se-
quencing, and comprehension of abstract ideas. 7 The determina-
tion of competency is routinely within the province of physicians
dealing with medical problems and the patient's competency to
make a decision to die should not be an exception. Routine re-
course to the courts for this purpose is not necessary.5
C. Roles of Participants
To promote the respect for patients as individuals and to re-
duce health care provider liability for purposeful omissions in
treatment, the parties must frankly discuss the decision to be
made in a hopeless or terminal illness situation. The Montana Nat-
ural Death Act will facilitate that process. '
The competent adult patient should be the decision-maker un-
less he knowingly transfers his authority to another. On the one
hand, the health care provider maintains a predisposition for sus-
taining life and discourages the patient's acquiescence to death. On
the other hand, the primary physician must recommend a medi-
cally sound course of action and assist the patient in the making of
an informed decision about treatment. While the grieving family
members may support the patient's wishes, they cannot be ex-
pected to be dispassionate; their grief and anxiety are often greater
than the patient's. The clergy can attend especially to religious
questions and rituals that affirm the spiritual and temporal mean-
ing of the patient and his family.5 9
A major obstacle to an equitable resolution of the incompetent
patient's right to die arises when the patient's family disagrees
with the health care provider's proposed course of action. One
party may wish to terminate treatment while the other may favor
the status quo. Uncounted millions of health care dollars are spent
each year because of this impasse. The Montana Natural Death
Act will function to promote the development of a process wherein
57. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 123.
58. Id. at 126.
59. Id. at 41-52.
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this conflict can be resolved.
Although the court need not play a role in every substantive
decision to withhold treatment, there will be instances when the
discrete and disinterested opinion of the judiciary will be required
to resolve legal matters. While the court should not arbitrate dis-
agreements on moral matters, it should be involved in the simulta-
neous appointment of a guardian and guardian ad litem. The
guardian will usually be a family member who will exercise the in-
competent's right to refuse treatment by using the subjective stan-
dard of the patient: If competent, would the patient choose to have
the life-sustaining treatment removed?
The guardian ought to be guided in his decisions by available
knowledge of the patient's own desires and feelings, to the extent
that they were expressed before the patient became incompetent.
If the guardian cannot ascertain the choice the patient would have
made, he ought to be guided by the patient's best interests. Under
this standard such factors as the relief of suffering, the preserva-
tion or restoration of functioning, the quality as well as the extent
of life sustained, and the impact of the decision on those people
closest to the patient may be considered.60
The guardian ad litem should be appointed simultaneously
with the guardian. He will represent the legal interests of the in-
competent in any judicial proceeding, including a review of the
guardian's decision concerning the ward. The guardian ad litem
will realize the inherent subjective nature of the guardian's deci-
sions and will advocate the patient's desires from a more disinter-
ested position.
D. Passive Euthanasia Is Not Suicide
The death rights of a terminally or hopelessly ill, competent,
adult patient are clear. Medical ethics and legal rules prohibit
treatment administered against the patient's will. Various state su-
preme courts have ruled that declining life-sustaining medical
treatment may not be viewed as an attempt to commit suicide:
"Refusing medical intervention merely allows the disease to take
its natural course; if death were eventually to occur it would be the
result, primarily, of the underlying disease and not the result of a
self-inflicted injury." 61
60. Id. at 132-35.
61. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 351, 486 A.2d at 1224.
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E. Proportionate v. Disproportionate Treatment
The terms ordinary and extraordinary treatment must be elu-
cidated so that health care providers can perform their duties in a
confident and competent manner. These terms cause much confu-
sion and provide little guidance. A better approach involves the
determination of whether the proposed treatment is proportionate
or disproportionate vis-a-vis benefits or burdens for the patient. A
proportionate treatment has, in the view of the patient, at least a
reasonable chance of providing benefits which outweigh the bur-
dens attendant to the treatment. Thus, even if a proposed course
of treatment might be extremely painful or intrusive, such as a
surgical operation, the treatment may still be proportionate if the
prognosis is for complete cure or significant improvement in the
patient's condition. On the other hand, a minimally painful or in-
trusive treatment such as the use of a nasogastric tube for feeding,
may nonetheless be considered disproportionate to the potential
benefits if the prognosis is virtually hopeless for any significant im-
provement of the condition.2
The benefit-burden standard assumes that: (1) a determina-
tion has been carefully made by qualified medical personnel; (2)
the patient's spouse or appropriate surrogate concurs with the pro-
posed withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures; and (3) the deci-
sion is consistent either with the expressed desires of the patient or
what the spouse/surrogate believes the patient would have wanted
under the circumstances.
Under the proportionate-disproportionate or benefit-burden
analysis, surgical operations and mechanical devices such as ven-
tilators, pacemakers, and hemodialysis machines may be extraordi-
nary treatment. Intravenous feeding,6" antibiotics, and nasogastric
tube feedings '4 also might be extraordinary under this analysis.
62. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 82-90; Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1019,
195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
"[O]ne would have to think that the use of the same respirator or life support could be
considered ordinary in the context of the possibly curable patient but extraordinary in the
context of the forced sustaining by cardio-respiratory processes of an irreversibly doomed
patient." Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 48, 355 A.2d at 668.
"[T]he focal point of decision should be the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of
return to cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished from the forced continuance of that
biological vegetative existence .... " Id. at 51, 355 A.2d at 669.
"Prolongation of life . . . does not mean a mere suspension of the act of dying, but
contemplates, at the very least, a remission of symptoms enabling a return towards a nor-
mal, functioning, integrated existence." In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 472-73, 380
N.E.2d 134, 138 (1978).
63. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484.
64. Conroy, 98 N.J. 331, 486 A.2d 1209; In re Severn, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980).
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"As recently as five years ago . .. the idea that fluids and nutri-
ment might be withdrawn, with moral and perhaps legal impunity,
from dying patients, was a notion that would have been repudi-
ated, if not condemned, by most health professionals. '"65 Although
many arguments can be raised for continuation of nourishment, in
certain cases the patient would neither expect nor desire continued
nourishment if he could competently express himself. In some
cases, nourishment may actually detract from the patient's dying
with dignity."
F. Prognosis Committee
The primary physician should be responsible for confirming
the diagnosis and prognosis of an incompetent, terminally or hope-
lessly ill patient. This can be accomplished by consulting a second
physician, preferably one with special expertise in treatment of the
disease or condition in question. If there is disagreement between
physicians or between the physicians and the family regarding the
diagnosis and prognosis, the matter should be referred to a "prog-
nosis committee" within the medical institution for a second opin-
ion. This ad hoc committee, composed of the patient's physician
and at least two other physicians with relevant qualifications,
would be selected on a case-by-case basis. If these physicians unan-
imously agree that there is no reasonable medical probability that
the patient will return to a rational and functional state, they
should enter that opinion in the patient's medical record . 7 Selec-
tion of prognosis committee members should be made by the medi-
cal staff president and would include only physicians. The progno-
sis committee would function only to confirm the diagnosis and
prognosis. It would not have the duties of a multidisciplinary eth-
ics committee which may establish bioethical policies for the insti-
tution. The prognosis committee, rather than the court, should de-
termine the time at which it can be said there is no reasonable
probability that a patient will recover from his terminal or hope-
less condition. 8
V. PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The following is the author's proposal. The general form is
65. Siegler, Against the Emerging Stream: Should Fluids and Nutritional Support
Be Discontinued?, 145 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 129 (1985).
66. Meyers, Legal Aspects of Withdrawing Nourishment from an Incurably Ill Pa-
tient, 145 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 125 (1985).
67. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 134-35, 660 P.2d 738, 749-50 (1983).
68. Id. at 135, 660 P.2d at 750.
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taken from statutes in California and Virginia. Unique provisions
within this proposed statute incorporate recent rulings of the
Washington Supreme Court."9
Section
1. Short title.
2. Statement of purpose.
3. Legislative findings.
4. Definitions.
5. Procedure for declaration by competent patient.
6. Suggested form of written declaration.
7. Revocation of declaration.
8. Procedure for incompetent patient.
9. Conflicts among the parties.
10. Sanctions; immunities; burden of proof; presumption.
11. Mercy killing or euthanasia prohibited.
12. Effect of declaration; suicide; insurance.
1. Short title. This chapter shall be known and may be cited
as the "Montana Natural Death Act."
2. Statement of purpose. The legislature of Montana desires
to affirm that persons have the fundamental right to control the
decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, in-
cluding the decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or
withdrawn in instances of a terminal or hopeless condition.
Through the Natural Death Act, the legislature seeks to minimize
differences between those who execute living will declarations and
those who do not, and to guarantee each the right to choose appro-
priate medical treatment for themselves.
3. Legislative findings. The legislature finds that modern
medical technology has made possible the artificial prolongation of
human life beyond natural limits; however, the changing standards
of medical care have resulted in the recognition that it may not
always be appropriate to use therapy to sustain the life of a termi-
nally ill patient, or one who has no hope for a meaningful recovery.
The legislature further finds that society is searching for ways
to re-humanize the dying process and solve the conflict between
modern technology and human needs of the dying.
The legislature further finds that in the interest of protecting
individual autonomy, prolongation of life for such persons may
cause loss of personal dignity and unnecessary pain and suffering,
69. See generally Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 660 P.2d 738; In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d
810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
[Vol. 47
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 47 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol47/iss2/5
NATURAL DEATH ACT
while providing nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the
patient.
The legislature further finds that there exists considerable un-
certainty in the medical and legal professions as to the propriety of
terminating the use or application of life-sustaining procedures
when the patient has not executed a valid living will but has volun-
tarily and in sound mind evidenced a desire that such procedures
be withheld or withdrawn.
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which persons have a
right to expect, the legislature hereby declares that the laws of the
state of Montana shall recognize (i) the right of a competent adult
person to make an oral or written declaration instructing such per-
son's physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures
in the event of a terminal or hopeless medical condition and (ii)
the right of a minor or incompetent adult to have a surrogate exer-
cise these rights by proxy.
4. Definitions. As used in this chapter, the following defini-
tions apply:
(1) "Primary physician" means a person licensed to practice
medicine in the State of Montana who has primary responsibility
for the treatment and care of the patient.
(2) "Declaration" means either (i) a witnessed document in
writing, or (ii) a witnessed oral statement, made by the declarant
prior to, or subsequent to, the time the patient is diagnosed as suf-
fering from a terminal or hopeless condition and in accordance
with the provisions of section 5. This declaration shall be binding
upon the physician and nurse and all other health care providers
including hospitals and nursing homes. Failure to abide by this
declaration shall result in sanctions in accordance with the provi-
sions of section 10.
(3) "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical procedure,
treatment or intervention which: (i) utilizes mechanical or other
artificial means including but not limited to ventilators, oxygen,
hemodialysis, resuscitation, nasogastric or intravenous feeding
tubes, blood transfusions, antibiotics, chemotherapy and insulin to
sustain, restore or supplant a spontaneous vital function and is of
such a nature as to afford a patient no significant benefit nor rea-
sonable expectation of recovery from the terminal or hopeless con-
dition; (ii) when applied to a patient in a terminal or hopeless con-
dition, would be useless in promoting recovery, would add
excessive pain or burden to the patient, and would serve only to
prolong the dying process; however, nothing in this section shall
reduce the duty to administer medications or perform acts deemed
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necessary to provide comfort or alleviate pain.
(4) "Qualified patient" means (i) any competent adult patient
who has made a declaration in accordance with this chapter and
who is terminally or hopelessly ill or (ii) any permanently incompe-
tent adult patient or minor patient who is medically adjudged to
be in a terminal or hopeless condition in accord with the defini-
tions provided herein.
(5) "Hopeless condition" means a severe disease or injury from
which, to a reasonable degree of medical probability (i) there can
be no meaningful recovery and (ii) basic bodily functions require
the continuous sustenance of life-sustaining procedures.
(6) "Terminal condition" means a condition caused by injury
or disease from which, to a reasonable degree of medical
probability: (i) there can be no meaningful recovery and (ii) death
will occur within a relatively short time without the application of
a life-sustaining procedure.
(7) "Prognosis Committee" means a hospital or nursing home
ad hoc committee formed to offer a formal medical opinion on the
terminal or hopeless condition of an incompetent patient when a
disagreement about future medical treatment arises between the
health care providers and the family or surrogate of the patient.
Any of the involved parties can request this opinion. The commit-
tee shall be appointed by the medical staff president and be com-
posed of the primary physician and two other physicians. The only
function of the committee is to ascertain the terminal or hopeless
condition of the patient. The opinion of the prognosis committee
shall be made part of the patient's medical record.
5. Procedure for declaration by competent patient; effect.
Any competent adult may, at any time, make a written declaration
directing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining proce-
dures in the event such person should have a terminal or hopeless
condition. A written declaration shall be signed by the declarant in
the presence of two disinterested subscribing witnesses. An oral
declaration may be made by a competent adult in the presence of a
physician and two disinterested witnesses by any nonwritten
means of communication at any time subsequent to the diagnosis
of a terminal or hopeless condition.
It shall be the responsibility of the declarant to provide notifi-
cation to his primary physician that a written declaration has been
made. In the event the declarant is comatose, incompetent or oth-
erwise mentally or physically incapable, any other person may no-
tify the physician of the existence of a declaration. The primary
physician who is so notified shall promptly make the declaration,
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or a copy of the declaration, a part of the declarant's medical
records. If the declaration is oral, the physician shall likewise
promptly make the fact of such declaration a part of the patient's
medical record.
A proper declaration shall become effective immediately and
shall be binding on the primary physician and other health care
provider.
6. Suggested form of a written declaration. A declaration ex-
ecuted pursuant to this chapter may but need not be in the follow-
ing form, and may include other specific directions including, but
not limited to, a designation of another person to make the treat-
ment decision for the declarant should he be (i) diagnosed as suf-
fering from a terminal or hopeless condition and (ii) be comatose,
incompetent or otherwise mentally or physically incapable of com-
munication. Should any other specific directions be held to be in-
valid, such invalidity shall not affect the declaration.
Declaration made this - day of (month,
year). I, , willfully and voluntarily make known
my desire that my dying shall not be artificially prolonged under
the circumstances set forth below, and do hereby declare:
(a) If at any time I should have a terminal or hopeless condi-
tion and my primary physician has determined that there can be
no meaningful recovery from such condition or my death is likely
to occur within a very short time, where the application of life-
sustaining procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the
dying process, I direct that such procedures be withheld or with-
drawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally with only the ad-
ministration of medication or the performance of any medical
procedure deemed necessary to provide me with comfort or to al-
leviate pain.
(b) In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding
the use of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that
this declaration shall be honored by my family and physician as
the final expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical
treatment. I accept the consequences of such a refusal.
(c) It is my intention that this declaration shall be valid until
revoked by me (signature and date).
(d) The declarant is known to me and voluntarily signed this
document in my presence (signed by two dis-
interested witnesses).
7. Revocation of declaration. A declaration shall be effective
until revoked by the declarant according to this section. A declara-
tion may be revoked at any time and in any manner by the declar-
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ant. Any revocation shall be effective when communicated to the
primary physician. No civil or criminal liability shall be imposed
upon any person for a failure to act upon a revocation unless that
person has actual knowledge of such revocation.
8. Procedure for incompetent patient. (1) Life-sustaining
procedures may be withheld or withdrawn from an adult or minor
patient with a terminal or hopeless condition who (i) is comatose,
or medically adjudged to be permanently incompetent and (ii) has
not made a declaration in accordance with this chapter, provided
there is consultation and agreement for the withholding or the
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures between the primary phy-
sician and a second physician with expertise in the diagnosis and
treatment of the patient's illness, and any of the following surro-
gate individuals, in the following order of priority if no individual
in a prior class is reasonably available, willing, and competent to
act:
(a) The person or persons designated by the patient in writing
to make the treatment decision for him should he be diagnosed as
suffering from a terminal or hopeless condition;
(b) The person holding the durable power of attorney for the
patient;
(c) The patient's spouse;
(d) An adult child of the patient or, if the patient has more
than one adult child, by a majority of the children who are reason-
ably available for consultation;
(e) The parents of the patient;
(f) The nearest living relative of the patient;
(g) The judicially appointed guardian and guardian ad litem.
(2) The proper surrogate has a duty to the incompetent pa-
tient to exercise by proxy the patient's right to die under appropri-
ate medical circumstances.
(3) In any case where the treatment decision is made by a
family member, there shall be at least one non-party witness
present.
(4) In the absence of family members, designated person, or
durable power of attorney, anyone of the involved parties may ini-
tiate judicial action for appointment of a guardian and guardian ad
litem in order to ensure that the qualified patient's right to choose
appropriate medical treatment is not forfeited.
(5) The absence of a declaration by an adult patient shall not
give rise to any presumption as to his intent to allow or refuse life-
sustaining procedures.
(6) Proxy decisions will be made only when, to a reasonable
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degree of medical probability, the lack of decision-making capacity
is permanent. If the patient regains his competency, the proxy de-
cision is void.
(7) The surrogate's proxy decision should use the subjective
standard of the patient by which the surrogate attempts to reach
the decision that the incapacitated person would make if he or she
were able to choose. If the surrogate is unaware of the patient's
desires, the surrogate will make the decision based on the patient's
best interests.
(8) The guardian ad litem will represent the legal interests of
the incompetent in any judicial proceeding including a review of
the guardian's decision concerning the ward.
9. Conflicts among the parties. The responsibility for ensur-
ing that surrogate decisionmaking practices are of high quality
falls first to the attending physician. Routine judicial oversight is
neither necessary nor appropriate. In the event of conflict among
the physicians and patient-designated surrogate or family mem-
bers, the parties shall first informally and without judicial action
seek the opinion of the hospital prognosis committee. Upon failure
of the parties to resolve the disagreement after the prognosis com-
mittee has given its opinion, any of the parties can request the
court to appoint a guardian and guardian ad litem and oversee the
eventual resolution of the disagreement.
10. Sanctions; immunity; burden of proof; presumption.
Failure by the primary physician to effectuate the directive of a
qualified patient pursuant to this chapter shall constitute unpro-
fessional conduct unless the primary physician transfers the pa-
tient to another physician who will accomplish the directive. A
health care facility, physician or other person acting under the di-
rection of a physician shall not be subject to criminal prosecution
or civil liability or be deemed to have engaged in unprofessional
conduct as a result of the withholding or the withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedures from a patient with a terminal or hopeless
condition in accordance with this chapter. A person who authorizes
the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a
patient with a terminal or hopeless condition in accordance with a
qualified patient's declaration or as provided in section 8 shall not
be subject to criminal prosecution or civil liability for such action.
The provisions of this chapter shall be presumed to apply un-
less it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the person
authorizing or effectuating the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedures did not, in good faith, comply with the pro-
visions of this chapter. A declaration made in accordance with this
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article shall be presumed to have been made voluntarily.
11. Mercy killing or active euthanasia prohibited. Nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to condone, authorize or approve
mercy killing or active euthanasia, or permit any affirmative or de-
liberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural
process of dying.
12. Effect of declaration; suicide; insurance. The withhold-
ing or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified pa-
tient in accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall not
constitute a suicide. Nor shall the making of a declaration pursu-
ant to this article affect the sale, procurement or issuance of any
policy of life insurance. No policy of life insurance shall be legally
impaired or invalidated by the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedures from an insured qualified patient, notwith-
standing any term of the policy to the contrary. A person shall not
be required to make a declaration as a condition for being insured
for, or receiving, health care services.
VI. CONCLUSION
To protect the dignity and autonomy of its citizens, the legis-
lature should pass the Montana Natural Death Act. This Act will
expand the Living Will Act by protecting all patients' rights to re-
fuse disproportionate medical treatment. Further, the Act will
shield the providers of health care from criminal and civil liability
for passive euthanasia. Significant emotional and pecuniary savings
will result.
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